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Abstract
Through its adoption of the biomedical model of disease which promotes medical individualism and its reliance
on the individual-based anthropology, mainstream bioethics has predominantly focused on respect for autonomy
in the clinical setting and respect for person in the research site, emphasizing self-determination and freedom of
choice. However, the emphasis on the individual has often led to moral vacuum, exaggeration of human agency,
and a thin (liberal?) conception of justice. Applied to resource-poor countries and communities within developed
countries, autonomy-based bioethics fails to address the root causes of diseases and public health crises with
which individuals or communities are confronted. A sociological explanation of disease causation is needed to
broaden principles of biomedical ethics and provides a renewed understanding of disease, freedom, medical prac-
tice, patient-physician relationship, risk and benefit of research and treatment, research priorities, and health policy.
Introduction
Respect for autonomy or respect for persons has tended
to be the leading principle of biomedical ethics or
research ethics, respectively. This principle historically
has its roots in the liberal moral and political tradition
of the Enlightenment in Western Europe. Within this
tradition, the ethical justification of actions or practices
strongly depends on the free decisions of individuals, i.e.
an action or practice can only be ethically justified when
undertaken without any coercive influence and entered
by free and informed agreement. While there have
always been disagreements on the details, all theories of
autonomy agree on two essential conditions: the first is
liberty, specifying the independence from controlling
influences; the second is agency, referring to the capa-
city for intentional action[1]. Used in clinical ethics,
autonomy functions primarily to examine decision-mak-
ing in health care and serves to identify actions that are
protected by the rules of informed consent, informed
refusal, truth telling, and confidentiality[1]. Autonomy-
based approaches are strongly expressed in Tom Beau-
champ and James Childress’ classic text Principles of
Biomedical Ethics for clinical bioethics and, for research
ethics, the influential Belmont Report[1,2].
Many criticisms of autonomy-based bioethics have
appeared over the past thirty years from a number of
different angles, such as feminism, casuistry, disability
rights, multiculturalism, cultural studies, and ethnogra-
phy. In this article, we take a different approach by
exploring what we will call the ‘medical individualism’
that autonomy-based bioethics largely assumes, and by
raising questions about the relevance and impact of
autonomy-based bioethics in developing countries (and
communities within developed equitable ones), espe-
cially in light of initiatives to ‘build capacity’ in research
sites and to ensure access to healthcare in resource-poor
settings. This paper argues that the medical individual-
ism underlying autonomy-based bioethics renders the
latter incapable of addressing some of the most pressing
bioethical issues in resource-poor settings, which have
to do with social justice. The first section of this paper
considers some of the limitations of principlism. The
second section examines the inability of this approach
* Correspondence: maishaze@yahoo.com
1Faculté de Médécine Teilhard de Chardin, Complexe Médical le Bon
Samaritain, N’djaména, BP 456, Chad
Azétsop and Rennie Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2010, 5:1
http://www.peh-med.com/content/5/1/1
© 2010 Azétsop and Rennie; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
to address social justice concerns in resource-poor
countries. Finally, the third section attempts to offer an
alternative approach by exploring the contribution of
the sociological model of disease causation to research
ethics, health justice and health policy.
A brief anatomy of autonomy-based bioethics
One of the major defenders of the centrality of auton-
omy in bioethics, the British medical ethicist and pedia-
trician, Raanan Gillon argues that respect for autonomy
should hold a primary place among the four principles
of biomedical ethics[3]. Other proponents of autonomy,
Beauchamp and Childress, define autonomy as a form of
personal liberty of action where the individual deter-
mines his or her own course of action in accordance
with a plan chosen by himself or herself[1]. In applica-
tion to clinical medicine, respect for autonomy dictates
that patients with decision-making ability have a right to
voice their medical treatment preferences, and physi-
cians have the concomitant duty to respect those prefer-
ences[4]. Like Beauchamp and Childress, Gillon
embraces a Millian understanding of autonomy, under-
standing it as deliberated self rule; the ability and ten-
dency to think for oneself, to make decisions for oneself
about the way one wishes to lead one’s life based on
that thinking, and then to enact those decisions–is what
makes morality–any sort of morality–possible[3]. Given
its supreme ethical importance, autonomy is not merely
a value to be respected, but a virtue or trait that ought
to be actively developed, nurtured and promoted.
According to Gillon, other ethical principles (benefi-
cence, non-maleficence, and justice) presuppose (and
can be reduced to) respect for autonomy. Beneficence
and non-maleficence toward autonomous moral agents
presuppose respect for the autonomy of these agents
even when they choose to refuse medical interventions
which are life-saving. Gillon also takes an autonomy-
centered approach to justice, arguing that responding to
people’s needs justly will require respect for those peo-
ple’s autonomous views, including autonomous rejection
of offers to meet their needs; and, more importantly,
because providing for people’s needs requires resources,
including other people’s resources[3]. To conclude his
praise for autonomy, Gillon writes that respect for
autonomy contingently builds in a prima facie moral
requirement to respect both individual and cultural
moral variability[3]. While it is true that not all auton-
omy-based approaches in bioethics take the explicit and
extreme form expressed by Gillon, autonomy continues
to be treated implicitly as a primary value in many con-
troversial clinical and research debates, from end of life
issues (such as the Terri Shiavo case) to questions of
exploitation of research subjects in international health
research. When ethical principles conflict, it is often
thought that the conflict can be resolved in an ideally
impartial way by asking, for example, what the patient
wants (or would have wanted) or whether the research
subject really understood and freely consented to the
procedures described in the research protocol. In this
way, the multifarious values involved in the practice of
medicine and biomedical research tend to be reduced to
the principle of respect for persons, itself narrowly
understood as respect for autonomy. Furthermore, the
preeminence of autonomy as an ethical value within
bioethics is deeply related to the increasing commoditi-
zation of medicine in developed countries. For the more
that medical practices are justified by reference to
patient choice, the more that patients will be viewed as
‘clients’ and health care professionals perceived as ‘ser-
vice providers’. This model of patient as ‘client’, which is
prevalent in the United States of America and some
parts of the western world, assumes affluence and
power: the (literate) patient has to be capable of under-
standing and rationally weighing his/her options–possi-
bly even in disagreement with the physician–and be in a
position to pay in exchange for services chosen.
Autonomy, exaggeration of human agency, and ethical
pluralism
An autonomy-based ethics places the responsibility for
medical decision-making largely in the hands of the
patient. This raises the descriptive question of whether
this conception accurately depicts how clinical decisions
are actually made, as well as the normative question
about whether such a conception of responsibility
should (or should not) function as a universal ideal. In
regard to the descriptive issue, patients in resource-poor
settings are often not concerned with their ability to
determine and shape the course of cure. Their arrival at
the local health center is the outcome of a long family
discussion that led to the collection of money. Some-
times, the patient arrives at the dispensary when the dis-
ease has reached its critical stage because the cost of
care is too high. The primary expectation of both
patient and family is to get the medicine or undergo a
medical procedure they need and go back to their work-
place. Spending time at the hospital means loss of earn-
ings for them and their families or the diminishment of
financial resources. When people can barely afford the
cost of care or satisfy the nutritional requirements for a
good recovery, the ethics of medical encounter should
be understood differently and expressed in different
terms than patient choice. Instead of developing a
highly-organized medical bureaucracy that cares for the
enforcement of patients’ rights and protects medical
professionals from accusations of malpractice, it would
be more helpful to develop new sets of values that guide
medical practice and promote patient participation in
the healing relationship. The framing of these values
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may encourage and foster a non-confrontational rela-
tionship between health professionals and patients in
the clinical setting, and include social challenges that
influence health in the bioethics agenda. The role of
bioethics will then consist in identifying social values
and laws that may guide clinical work, restore the social
dimension of medicine, connect the macro-determinants
of health to medical practice and health system delivery,
avoid the fragmentation of healthcare, and advocate for
good health policies.
The challenge facing bioethics in resource-poor set-
tings is not then to mislead people with unrealistic pro-
mises of autonomy that very few people can indeed
achieve, but to articulate moral principles and societal
values that are oriented around the promotion of equita-
ble access to care and which broaden the goals of medi-
cine and public health. The goals of medicine cannot be
confined to the alleviation of suffering within the clinical
setting. Medicine needs to be concerned with the deter-
minants of good and bad health outside the clinical con-
text in order to contribute to evidence-based clinical and
public health interventions and education. The major
bioethical questions prevalent in resource-poor countries
do not essentially revolve around the provision of
informed consent at the individual level, but rather
around the burning social questions of access to care,
commodification and quality of medical care, the rela-
tionship between income disparities and health inequi-
ties, the impact of poverty and underdevelopment on
population health, priorities in biomedical research, and
impacts of gender discrimination on women’s health[5,6].
Once the focus is shifted away from the individualistic
‘patient as client’ paradigm, the social problems con-
nected with the domination of medicine by market forces
become apparent. If the goal of medicine is to restore
health functioning, bioethics should avoid adopting a
conception of autonomy that can be used to justify the
domination of healthcare delivery by market forces alone
and (wittingly or unwittingly) legitimizing health care
systems that exclude the needy sick because the latter are
unable to pay (or co-pay) for services or afford hefty
medical insurance premiums. Even those bioethicists
who promote market-driven medicine based on a liber-
tarian anthropology[7,8] ought to carefully articulate
alternative ethical values for health care and biomedical
research, if they not to be lured into a ‘self-defeating’
conception of medicine. As an example of the latter ten-
dency, Robert Sade considers medicine as a market com-
modity and understands medical practice as sets of skills
that physicians are entitled to sell on the marketplace to
make as much money as possible. Even the cries of the
destitute sick or government regulatory function cannot
restrict the physicians’ appetite for greater financial
reward. Sade’s anthropology and approach to medicine is
based on the assumption that individuals have the right
to select the values that they deem necessary to sustain
one’s own life. They are also entitled to exercise their
judgment to take the best course of action to achieve
chosen values. Finally, they have the right to dispose of
those values, once gained, in any way one chooses, with-
out coercion by other men[7]. Similarly, Tristram Engel-
hardt protects human freedom to the point of ignoring
the fact that the concern that we have for each other
makes life in society possible. For him, as long as freedom
functions as a side constraint, and as long as the moral
community is based on respect for freedom and not
force, individual persons will have the possibility of hold-
ing entitlements[8], Engelhardt’s suggestion is paradoxi-
cal because, in trying to protect freedom of individuals to
use their resources to access health care and other goods,
he does not ensure that those with few resources have
the freedom to obtain health care. Realistically, a genuine
affirmation of autonomy cannot result in action informed
or motivated by the desire to avoid being a responsible
member of one’s moral community[9]. Here, responsibil-
ity means that one should not exploit others by using
autonomy as a warrant to market-driven medicine or
profit-seeking attitudes. Once medicine is understood as
a commoditized product like any other, those who can-
not afford services are merely unfortunate consumers. In
this way, a strong emphasis on autonomy can contribute
to a culture in which healing and health promotion are
no longer at the center of clinical practice and biomedical
research.
One can hardly refute the fact that complex social and
economic forces have placed patient autonomy at the
center of medical ethics, and thereby undermined the
age-old ethic of physician beneficence[10]. This change
is sustained by waning trust in the traditional patient-
physician relationship. With the control of medicine by
the forces of the market, patients have become consu-
mers of a market commodity called medical care. As a
result of this change, the clinical relationship between
the patient and physician begins to be seen as a contract
and not as a covenant of care as it was in the past.
Autonomy-based bioethics has a tendency to distort the
relationship between individuals and the world. On the
one hand, it exaggerates the power and range of indivi-
dual agency; furthermore, it underestimates the impact
of society, culture and environment, both on individual
decision-making and on health. If persons are regarded
as atomistic, certain defensive notions of individualistic
rights-based autonomy prevail. If a relational construc-
tion of personal identity is employed instead, then
respect for autonomy becomes part of a wider morality
of relationship and care[1]. ‘Atomistic autonomy’ is divi-
sive and lacks social rootedness while relational auton-
omy brings about trust and communality. The second
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version of autonomy, which reveals our true self in
society, presents the possibility of placing trust and part-
nership at the center of the patient-physician relation-
ship. With such an understanding of personhood,
bioethics can better balance its concerns over choices
and actions with those of relationship and responsibility.
A more plausible philosophical anthropology would con-
ceive individuals as entangled in the world, both capable
of acting on it and subject to being affected by it.
Reflection on the notion of disease, both infectious
and chronic, can contribute to a more plausible philoso-
phical anthropology for bioethics. Infectious diseases
question our understanding of autonomous agency in
two important ways. First, as both a victim and a vector,
a patient cannot be simply seen as a rational agent who
has the final ethical word on his own decisions. Both
vulnerability to infection and threat of transmission to
others should shape our understanding of patient
agency. Second, the concept of choice that shapes our
conception of agency in bioethics can no longer be
understood in isolation from society. Risk of acquiring
and transmitting infectious diseases reflects the patient’s
interconnectedness with others and the biological envir-
onment, an interconnectedness which is always there
even when infectious disease is not present[11].
Although the values and desires of the patient obviously
need to be considered, the ideal of the autonomous
agent will remain a fiction unless the social context of
the patient’s vulnerability is also considered. For other
reasons, chronic disease also challenges our understand-
ing of autonomy, especially when the patient finds it
hard to manage his or her chronic condition. Family or
friends stand as important resources for decision-mak-
ing and long-term daily care for chronic diseases. We
should then recognize that the family and community,
which may play an important role in patient care, are
part of the resource needed by the patient to exercise
agency[12]. More and more, it is becoming obvious that
the promotion of patients’ agency requires serious con-
sideration of patients’ best interests in a broader way.
Against the backdrop of contemporary institutional
medicine, family solidarity is more important than ever
to help maintain patient’s dignity and agency throughout
stressful time[13]. Exclusion of family and relatives from
the sphere of decision-making on account of respect for
individual autonomy does not necessarily serve patients’
best interest. Furthermore, primary care, because of its
focus on treatment and prevention of chronic and infec-
tious diseases, is the domain of medicine that goes
beyond techno-medical solutions to consider patients as
persons with their stories, relationships, and social
environment in which they live. Consequently, primary
care should essentially rely on socially-grounded values
rather than on desocialized principles[14].
Family and social relationships are important in the
context of clinical medicine. However, we cannot under-
mine the importance of individual freedom. We simply
reject strong claims that do not have any social rooted-
ness. It would be almost unsound and socially untrue to
radically endorse autonomy to the detriment of an ethic
of responsibility and socially-based care because they are
mutually interdependent, and a complete account of
medicine’s moral axis requires that they be integrated.
This reorientation is crucial for reasserting the ethos of
clinical medicine, whose fundamental mandate remains
the care of others[10].
Autonomy ethics and the ‘moral vacuum’
For Immanuel Kant, respect for persons never refers to
the freedom to be left alone. Kant’s understanding of
respect for autonomy provides the ground for the cate-
gorical imperative, which he formulated in five different
ways. The third formulation, “.act so that you treat
humanity whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as means only” [15]
cannot be reduced to the respect for autonomy often
found in the bioethics literature. The view of autonomy
commonly found among individuals and in some of the
bioethics literature in North America or Western cul-
ture is more in tune with John Stuart Mill’s formulation
of liberty: do not intrude on the freedom of any person
by an invasion foreign to his or her own wishes and
values. When Kant talks about autonomy, he does not
imply that one should act according to one’s own
desires, unconstrained by a balanced consideration of
one’s situation as a being-among-others[9] Instead, he
refers to the dignity of humans who are capable of mak-
ing for themselves and others universal law. Hence,
autonomy, rightly construed... results in action informed
and motivated by the desire to be responsible member
of one’s moral community (the ground of one’s being-
among-others)[9]. Kantian autonomy is tied the moral
agent’s search for the truth and respectable conduct.
The autonomous subject does not act in accordance to
his or her primary inclination. Kantian autonomy is
applied to actions performed when the will is freed from
any selfish determination. When humans treat each
other as ends and never as means merely, there arises a
systematic union of rational beings under common
objective laws. Physician and patient, each with their
own needs, desires, capabilities, must find those princi-
ples that allow them to coalesce into a helping alliance
to achieve a common goal.
Contemporary readings often accept a Millian version
of autonomy that is associated with self-seeking atti-
tudes. This approach to respect for autonomy refers to
the capacity to act on needs, wants, or wishes; a capacity
shared by many creatures. Since the person’s action is
informed by instrumental reasoning, it constricts the
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scope of reason so that it is subject to any desire or dis-
position that one happens to endorse at the time one
acts[9]. Focusing essentially on individual choices sets
up a false and pernicious opposition between persons
and the community to which they belong. It is reason-
able, on both conceptual and empirical grounds, to sup-
pose that individuals acquire their values through
engagement with a concrete moral tradition, rather than
through a private and self-directed process. Instead of
providing ethical decision-making with an objective and
rational process, the obsession with individual autonomy
tends to create what McCormick calls a ‘moral vacuum’,
i.e. the disappearance of the network of shared and
established goods and values that make the choices of
individuals right or wrong, moral or immoral[16].
Balancing autonomy and community in ethical decision-
making
It is hard to undermine the influence of social, cultural
and environmental factors on moral decision making.
We have to take these factors into account in order to
fully appreciate the moral dilemmas and health chal-
lenges in settings and traditions where individualism
does not prevail. Writing from their Jewish background,
Barth-Rogers and Jotkowitz note that within Jewish tra-
dition, the idea of unlimited human autonomy is not a
defining value; Judaism deems the intrinsic human value
of each individual’s life to take precedence over patient
autonomy[12]. Similarly, the Confucian culture from
East Asia understands the person not only as a rational,
autonomous being but also as a relational and altruistic
entity whose self-actualization involves participating in
and promoting the welfare of fellow persons[4]. In the
same line of thought, African traditions present a view
of the human person that is essentially relational; it is
within the social network that the individual lives and
acts as a free person. The Jewish, Confucian, and Afri-
can cultures convey an understanding of the human
person and society which is different from individualism
operative in some cultures.
This is where the shortcomings of Gillon’s autonomy-
centered conception of bioethics become the most
obvious. Gillon does not reject the view that particular
cultures should be respected, instead he theorizes that
the prima facie nature of autonomy requires that both
the individual and cultural moral variability be respected
[3]. But this sense of respect for culture does not ade-
quately reflect the social rootedness of the human per-
son. Despite making ‘concessions’ to culture, Gillon
continues to view societal relationships, determinants
and influences to be peripheral to human reason and,
because of the danger of ethical relativism, something to
be transcended by a universal ethic. Hence, the four
principles (with autonomy as supreme among them) can
account for all our moral worries and being applied
straightforwardly to all situations and contexts[17]. Gil-
lon contends that any other moral principle or value
can be explained by one or some combination of the
four principles. In fact, however, Gillon’s quest for a
universal discourse is nothing more than the promotion
of one approach to ethics among others, one which
reflects specific cultural assumptions concerning indivi-
dual choice and future-oriented action that are asso-
ciated with class position and social opportunities and
foreign to the lived reality of the poor, the marginalized,
and people of color in a multicultural society like the
United States[18]. Any attempt to universalize an ethnic
particularity fails the test of respect for pluralism in
bioethics and in our ever-globalizing world.
In resource-poor countries where medical paternalism
prevails on account of patient beneficence and shared-
responsibility for health promotion[19], the necessity to
create the conditions that improve, for example, patient-
physician communication in ways that favor patient
agency needs to be acknowledged. Very often, the physi-
cian does not even tell the patient what is going on with
his or her health. However, the one-sided view of the
human person which prevails in autonomy-based bioethics
should not be adopted as a model to correct paternalism; a
more fruitful alternative would be a combination between
a community- and tradition-oriented view and autonomy
that conceives decision-making as guided by important
human values such as partnership, trust and solidarity, in
addition to autonomy. This view would acknowledge the
embedded and relational nature of human choices, beha-
vior, ways of expressing emotions and feelings, patterns of
thinking, and conceptions of disease and healing.
Autonomy, biomedical individualism, and social
justice
Some criticisms of autonomy-centered bioethics have
been purely conceptual. Others have emerged from
reflections on its limitations in dealing with collective
macro-problems including social, sanitary and environ-
mental problems that mark everyday life in poor coun-
tries. Autonomy-based bioethics fails to engage the lived
worlds of diversely constituted and situated social
groups, particularly those that are marginalized[18].
Similarly, in clinical medicine, broad issues such as the
common good, distributive justice and the spirituality of
the patient are ignored for the sake of the primacy of
secular business concerns. To guide clinical practice,
laws have been developed to reduce risk for malpractice
and protect patients. However, emphasis placed on the
principle of autonomy has led to an excessive control of
clinical practice by judicial institutions. Consequently,
this obsession with the law has led to the elimination of
a wide range of moral concerns from public considera-
tion[16]. To emphasize this point, McCormick criticizes
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clinical ethics for being preoccupied with cost control
that focuses narrowly on matters of financial efficiency,
thus exiling the more basic ethical questions (ends of
medicine, the meaning of life, death, illness and health)
[16]. Furthermore, any public health intervention that
adopts the biomedical model fails to address issues of
wider social injustices that are responsible for health-
related vulnerability and risk.
Autonomy ethics and medical individualism
The biomedical model is premised on individualism,
because it adopts an abstract view of the body and mind
of an individual person from a liberal model of economy
and politics[20]. In this model, individuals choose health
behaviors. Thus, poor health is largely due to exposures
to health risks that the individuals have decided not to
avoid. This approach to health risks disregards the role
of social structures in structuring the array of risk fac-
tors that individuals are supposed to avoid[18], and fails
to explain how social inequalities can be embodied in
poor-health outcomes[21]. Thus, autonomy-focused
bioethics, rather than presenting an objective perspec-
tive, deprives itself of theoretical tools to adequately
address non-pathological causes of ill-health. Similarly,
in research sites, much effort is often invested in secur-
ing the informed consent of individual participants
while often ignoring the broader issues of justice in
places where research takes place[22]. Consequently, the
absolutization of autonomy with the unreal and dis-
torted picture of the person helps explain why so much
bioethical writing is concerned with procedures that
protect choice, rather than more substantive issues, with
consent itself rather than what is consented to[16]. This
tendency to make the social causes of poor health (and
the broader ethical problems related to health improve-
ment) invisible can even be seen among those working
in public health to the extent that they subscribe to the
biomedical model[20].
Biomedical model and the social gradient in health
Health differentials between individuals cannot be
explained simply by their health behavior or lifestyles,
but also by their social position and economic status,
the social networks to which they belong, and the levels
of education that provide them with the means to avoid
health risks, deal with adversity, and have access to life-
protecting information. The pervasiveness of the social
gradient in health remains even when well-designed
public health interventions are implemented. Even when
these public health interventions may reduce health
risks and mortality, they do not eliminate the social gra-
dient because individuals in the lower socioeconomic
groups take less advantage of health interventions than
those who are better off.
When we compare the health statistics between poor
and rich within countries or between countries, the
differentials are striking. HIV/AIDS statistics provide us
with striking examples of the impacts of socioeconomic
status on risk differentials and chances of survival
between groups within countries and between countries.
Even in developed countries, the geography of HIV/
AIDS challenges us to investigate the social causes of its
distribution. Risks and survival differentials prompt us
to consider a view that places political-economic cri-
tiques of global resource distributions, and criticism
based on the higher and qualitatively different disease
burdens in poor countries within a common framework
of international and internal socio-economic structure
[23]. At the local level, income inequality in poor coun-
tries affects health and can be an indicator of life expec-
tancy[24,25]. Poverty affects individuals’ ability to have
access to goods which are instrumental for well-being.
At the country level, poverty limits government’s ability
to found social programs and provide people with basic
social goods such as safe drinking water, electricity,
good public health coverage, healthcare institutions,
schools, social services, and economic opportunities.
These structural causes are steady and they include
access to basic resources that can be used to avoid all
sorts of health risks or reduce the negatives outcomes of
diseases when they occur[26].
Most public health interventions focus on individual
risk factors and behavior. To lessen vulnerability and
risk, health professionals will need to address income
differences between individuals and population groups.
Otherwise, they will only address the symptoms and not
the root-causes of poor health. As public health practi-
tioners and other health professions ‘resocialize’ their
conceptions of health and disease, bioethicists should
join and inform their efforts. A sociological approach to
disease can increase the social relevance of bioethics
because it provides an acute perception of disease etiol-
ogy and pathology that includes the social and material
conditions in which people live.
Sociological model and autonomy-based bioethics
To underscore the difference between Western and
non-Western conception of illness, Bowman writes that
most non-Western cultures tend to perceive illness in a
much broader and far less tangible manner. Illness is
often viewed as being linked to social, spiritual, and
environmental determinants[27]. The sociological model
of disease explanation shares some important connec-
tions with many non-Western cultures in which disease
representation and explanation is not primarily under-
stood in biomedical terms, but in social ones. Auton-
omy-based bioethics is premised on the view that
disease is located in the individual. The focus on the
individual person often reduces the scope of justice in
clinical medicine and health research to an equal
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treatment of individuals involved and a fair distribution
of available resources and burden regardless of people’s
social status, age, race, gender or religion. In the clinics,
for example, justice requires that patients whose circum-
stances are the same deserve the same level and quality
of care.
Conversely, the sociological model perceives the dis-
ease as an integrated social-physiological process which
includes the person’s relation to the environment. In
addition to its bio-physiological dimension, a disease is a
relational phenomenon; as a subjective and socially-con-
structed reality, a disease develops out of the omnipre-
sence of symptoms and bodily feelings in everyday life.
The sociological model allows us to develop a socially-
relevant approach to health justice, a new set of princi-
ples that may guide research as well as an approach to
health policy based on the features of the site where
research is done. Thus, this model points to the fact
that there are two reminders of our embeddedness in
the world relevant to bioethics: first, biological embedd-
edness and infectious disease and second, social
embeddedness, particularly (but not exclusively) in con-
texts where people are obviously dependent on one
another and traditional behavior and customs are
strong.
Contribution of medical sociology: Sociological model
and social justice
The current formulation of ethical principles as they are
applied to medical research in poor countries is inap-
propriate for capturing some crucial implications of
medical research since they ignore the roots of health
crises with which these countries are confronted[28].
Analyzing the health crises in African countries in the
late 1980s, the Cameroonian sociologist Jean-Marc Ela
argues that disease and malnutrition never exist by
themselves; rather they come from a system character-
ized by violence, by a pattern of impoverishment of the
majority, and by the monopoly by a minority of the
means to live with dignity[29]. Health interventions
should not merely address the symptoms of a disease-
producing society, but also its structures. Social struc-
tures not only shape distribution of disease across popu-
lation, but they also determine societal and individual
responses to suffering. When the major determinants of
health are far from being addressed by a conceptual fra-
mework that prioritizes individual problems and moral-
ity, there is a need to call its relevance into question.
The high rates of infectious diseases in poor countries
are linked to poor living conditions and structural pro-
blems. These primary sources of exposure and vulner-
ability to health hazards should necessarily be
considered in any attempt to develop bioethical stan-
dards for research or any bioethical agenda. The poverty
that permeates all spheres of society should be studied
because poverty never exists in isolation from societal
influences, but rather is integrally a product of the inner
workings of each society’s political economy. Minimizing
the contribution of poverty to the production of disease
and disability in poor countries makes suffering invisible
and limits our understanding of the etiology of disease.
Medical sociology scrutinizes patterns of diseases and
pathways through which social inequalities are embo-
died in individual vulnerabilities and major epidemics.
Thus, the model of disease causation that comes from
sociological investigations challenges us to move beyond
the clinics or research sites to broaden the scope of jus-
tice. Similarly, the prevalence of infectious diseases in
resource-poor countries challenges the way justice is
understood in research sites. If we consider the patient
as a potential victim and vector, we need to shift our
gaze from the healthcare that might be most desirable
for the individual patient to broader social concerns and
the worldview distribution of care that might enable all
to achieve opportunities over a reasonable life span[11].
The extension of care to all not only aims at serving
individual needs for care, but more importantly it
addresses infectious diseases as a threat to population
health. Opting out from an intervention of this kind
would simply mean that the individual remains a threat
to the entire population[3].
The sociological explanation of disease incorporates a
distinctive view of etiology, prevention, pathology, treat-
ment, and justice. This approach to disease explanation
tacitly promotes a conception of responsibility for infec-
tion or disease causation which is not only individual.
This approach questions the uses of individualism as
methodology and framework for analyzing disease
occurrence, and thus criticizes the one-sidedness of the
anthropology that sustains the biomedical model.
Sociological model and justice in current biomedical
research
Documents such as the Declaration of Helsinki issued by
the World Medical Association and the International
ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving
human subjects (CIOMS) as well as the work of the
National Council on Bioethics in 2002 and that of the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) in
2001 all take material poverty as the main reason for
developing bioethical standards that apply to medical
research conducted in poor countries. Surprisingly, the
bioethics standards they promote hardly reflect the phy-
sical, social, and cultural environment of poor countries.
This is another important area for revision[28].
Given the substantial differences in individual expo-
sure to health risks and the availability of health protec-
tive resources as well as differences in the disease
burden and mortality and morbidity at the population
level, it is clear that illness in poor countries can be
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better understood using a ‘social causation of illness’
perspective. The principles of respect for persons, bene-
ficence, and justice that shape the Belmont Report are
all built on the biomedical model. The principle of
respect for persons reinforces individual agency and
protection in the research setting by ensuring that parti-
cipants are properly informed about the research or the
course of care that will be taken to restore normal func-
tioning. The principle of beneficence extends the latter
by insisting that research protocols should maximize
potential benefits and minimize harm. Finally, the prin-
ciple of justice ensures that those with diminished
autonomy are protected and that participants share in
the benefits of the research. Agency, benefit, participa-
tion, risk, and vulnerability are all understood from the
standpoint of the individually-focused disease manage-
ment whether in the clinical setting or the research site.
To be of broader global significance, ethical principles
of biomedical research should be responsive to the con-
text of poverty and social inequities, since these struc-
tural factors can lead to increased vulnerability and
exploitation. For example, the incapacity of poor people
to satisfy their basic needs can lead to increased partici-
pation in clinical trials without true understanding of
risk and benefit at least in part due to financial incen-
tives. Thus, even if these people ‘consent’ to participa-
tion in a trial, is that decision truly autonomous? It is
then clear that ‘research protections’ cannot be ensured
solely through the use of the consent form and the pro-
vision of information to the subject. A formal provision
of consent by the research subject can simply mask the
misery that inhibits his or her ability to consent freely.
Similarly, what counts as ‘benefits’ can be tied to differ-
ent levels of poverty and disease burden in different
resource-poor countries. Ethical principles and guidelines
that oversee biomedical research can be defined in terms
of public good rather than merely as an improvement in
individual health status because public good and social
policy transcend the framework of individual-based ethics
[28]. In resource-poor countries, death-rates are high and
infectious diseases contribute significantly to the burden
of disease–as opposed to richer countries, where cardio-
vascular disease and cancer are the leading causes of mor-
tality–the difference in exposure, health risk, mortality,
and morbidity between poor and rich countries challenges
us to develop a new approach to the concept of benefit in
biomedical research. We need to think of ‘benefits’ as run-
ning to the whole community in which research takes
place, and not just to single research subjects. Therefore,
the availability of and access to modern health services is a
substantial issue for evaluating the impact of biomedical
research benefits in poor countries since the outcomes of
health initiatives are largely determined by some structural
arrangements that transcend the benefits of research
subjects. These arrangements are based upon national and
international patterns of control over society’s resources.
Current ethical guidelines continue to be inappropri-
ate because they do not address the international con-
text of exploitation within which research is done.
People’s health status cannot be separated from the
capitalist system of resource distribution and exchanges
which favors the rich countries or high socioeconomic
groups and reinforces the impoverishment of the poor
ones. The economic exploitation that prevails in the
capitalist system shapes the global and local distribution
of resources and diseases as well as the health risks and
vulnerability of those who live on the margins of the
global market. The concepts of ‘benefit’ and ‘justice’
have been inadequately extended to biomedical research
in poor countries because the possibility of exploiting
the underprivileged is more complex than an exploita-
tive relationship with vulnerable populations in devel-
oped countries, where at least the rule of law and the
respect due to every citizen have already been institutio-
nalized. Furthermore, the number of research studies
conducted in poor countries is increasing because regu-
latory measures are often less strict; this situation may
facilitate the exploitation of the poor, non-respect for
basic ethical standards, and unlimited search for benefit.
Bioethics scholarship that focuses on the sociological
model considers local as well as global issues of social
inequality, because this model is premised on the intimate
connection that exists between social inequality and health
inequality. The distribution of illness is likely to reflect the
geography of inequality. A social approach to bioethics
emphasizes distributive justice and benefits at both the
population and individual level. Three important princi-
ples flow from this analysis. The first one can be called
principle of public benefits (community-based approach to
benefits); it is a context-based principle which derives
from factors that contribute to ill-health and vulnerability
to preventable diseases in poor countries. It states that
risks, benefits, and equity can no longer be defined in
terms of individual health, but also in relation to the inter-
national, national and local contexts[23]. Such a principle
challenges the individualistic understanding of benefits in
places where exploitation and inequality are at the center
of research. Consequently, a community-based under-
standing of benefits calls for a large-scale distribution of
the benefits of research as an important requirement of
justice. This principle is relevant for political and socioeco-
nomic critiques of the ethics of carrying on research in
poor countries, given well-established patterns of exploita-
tion and oppression of the underprivileged. Reliance on
the sociological model brings out the fact that the health
conditions under study originate in socioeconomic condi-
tions that need to be treated to have an impact on the
health status of research participants[28]. Thus, the notion
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of population or community-based benefits is related to
that of health as a public good which is, in turn, linked to
the global-capitalistic system that significantly contributes
to the health conditions found in poor countries.
The second principle, the principle of social justice, is
rooted in a broad approach to justice that places poor
health at the center of public and research policy and
seeks to correct systemic injustices. This principle is
related to the principle of public benefit since it states
that the distribution of benefits should take into account
the poverty of local healthcare systems and people’s dis-
empowerment as a function of social structures[23].
Here, the challenge is that the distribution of benefits
should address the root-causes of poor health and not
only its symptoms. The third principle underscores the
need for building local capacity. This principle states
that building capacity to promote healthcare sustainabil-
ity will have a lasting effect on people’s health. This
principle emphasizes the need for building local capacity
and improving human capital to reduce the burden of
preventable diseases. For example, research on AIDS
vaccine often uses existing facilities or new ones built by
funding agencies to conduct research or administrate
the vaccine on trial. Building capacity may involve
researchers and funding agencies improving the training
of local medical professionals and reinforcing existing
facilities to reduce the burden of disease; and, if a new
medical facility has been built for the research study,
local communities can still use it even after the research
project comes to an end.
To avoid exploiting the underprivileged and reinfor-
cing an existing system of oppression, the distribution of
benefits should be determined by the context within
which diseases occur, the state of the healthcare system,
and available resources. Therefore, research institutions
and their financial sponsors are morally obligated to
contribute to the development of a healthcare system
and the improvement of human resources that can ben-
efit the whole population. Carrying on research in impo-
verished parts of the world where people have been
enduring a systemic marginalization would not be ethi-
cal if our understanding of benefit will not address the
root causes of poor health. Thus, it is no longer enough
to avoid not doing harm; addressing health challenges
that prevail in the research site is consistent with a
broader view of justice[28].
Sociological model, bioethics, and health policy
An autonomy-centered ethics places the burden of pre-
vention and access to healthcare on the moral agent. In
doing so, it frames disease within a model that limits poli-
tical intervention in the health domain strictly to biomedi-
cal solutions or behavior change. This leads to the
perpetuation of the social status quo within which risks for
poor health are greater, and lends legitimacy to the social
forces that increase health risks. This failure to promote
social justice contrasts with John Lynch’s understanding of
public health intervention. Lynch believes that elements of
the social fabric should shape the conception, framework,
and implementation of public health intervention. Discuss-
ing the influence of socioeconomic status on behavioral
and psychosocial risk factors for cardiovascular disease, he
argues that the public health community should consider
the potential for a broad array of social, educational, and
economic policies as effective public health interventions
to reduce the unequal distribution of risk factors and the
unequal burden of disease[30]. Similarly, bioethicists need
to study health-promoting effects of structural interven-
tions to determine which ones are ethically acceptable and
justified. Such a move requires bioethicists to look at
broad issues of social equity and advocate for a shift in
public policymaking.
In a population-based study examining the associa-
tions between socioeconomic status measures (educa-
tion, income, and occupation) reflecting different stages
of the lifecourse of 2674 middle-aged Finnish men,
health behaviors, and psychosocial characteristics in
adulthood, Lynch et al. conclude that: understanding
that adult health behavior and psychosocial health orien-
tations are associated with socioeconomic conditions
throughout the lifecourse implies that efforts to reduce
socioeconomic inequalities in health must recognize that
economic policy is public health policy[31]. The sociolo-
gical model within which Lynch’s understanding of pub-
lic health intervention is built challenges us to advocate
for a shift in policymaking mindset because health is
not a sphere of justice which is separate from other
aspects of human life. Since disease is a social process, a
policy vision that focuses on the individual and indivi-
dual risk factors fails to promote social justice and to
address structural elements that create conditions favor-
able to the production of disease. Hence, we need to
move from healthcare policy to health policy, or rather,
a healthcare policy that is responsive to facts explaining
why (certain) people with (certain) diseases from (cer-
tain) communities require medical care. Health policy
should embrace healthcare policies but include consid-
erations regarding welfare, work, occupational, economic
development, employment, and educational policies.
Conclusion
Sociologists and social epidemiologists challenge bioethi-
cists, especially those working in developing countries,
to be socially and culturally relevant. The sociological
theory of disease explanation starts with a concrete ana-
lysis of the social setting within which illness occurs or
research is carried on. Since societal factors shape pat-
terns of mortality and morbidity, principles of biomedi-
cal and research ethics need to be framed within the
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context of the social inequalities that shape vulnerability
to illness. Aligning bioethics to perspectives, concerns
and information in the fields of public health, health
policy and medical sociology could vastly improve its
global significance. Thus, bioethicists should be chal-
lenged to develop a philosophical anthropology that
goes beyond radical affirmations of the individuality to
acknowledge both the communal and the individual
dimension of the human person.
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